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Abstract. DLN is a recent approach that extends description logics
with defeasible reasoning capabilities. In this paper we provide an overview
on DLN, illustrating the underlying knowledge engineering requirements
as well as the characteristic features that preserve DLN from some recur-
rent semantic and computational drawbacks. We also compare DLN with
some alternative nonmonotonic semantics, enlightening the relationships
between the KLM postulates and DLN.
1 Introduction
In complex areas such as law and science, knowledge has been in centuries for-
mulated by primarily describing prototypical instances and properties, and then
by overriding the general theory to include possible exceptions. For example,
many laws are formulated by adding new norms that, in case of conflicts, may
partially or completely override the previous ones. Similarly, biologists have been
incrementally introducing exceptions to general properties. For instance, the hu-
man heart is usually located in the left-hand half of the thorax. Still there are
exceptional individuals, with so-called situs inversus, whose heart is located on
the opposite side. Eukariotic cells are those with a proper nucleus, by definition.
Still they comprise mammalian red blood cells, that in their mature stage have
no nucleus.1
Also many modern applications and methodologies in Computer Science rely
on some sort of overriding mechanism. In Object Oriented Programming the def-
initions in a subclass may override any conflicting bindings belonging to its su-
perclasses. Analogously, formal languages designed to describe role-based access
control or other privacy policies generally allow to formulate default conditions,
such as open and closed policies,2 conflict resolution methods such as denials
take precedence, and authorization inheritance with exceptions [14].
Summarizing, the mentioned fields manifest to a large extent different forms
of defeasible knowledge where general axioms can be recanted in special cases
by employing some suitable overriding mechanism. Nevertheless, this natural
approach cannot be directly adopted in designing Semantic Web ontologies. In
1 All of these examples are introduced and discussed in [39,41].
2 If no explicit authorization has been specified for a given access request, then an
open policy permits the access while a closed policy denies it.
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fact, the underlying descriptions logics (DLs), which are based on the monotonic
semantics of FOL, do not allow to express and reason on defeasible knowledge
and exceptions. Consequently, several authors advocated nonmonotonic logics
as a useful means to address this limitation and proposed different formalisms
based on circumscription [10,9,11], autoepistemic logic [24,25], typicality opera-
tors [26,28,31], or rational closure [29,20,6], just to mention a few.
In this context, DLN [7,15,13] is a recent family of nonmonotonic DL specif-
ically designed to meet the knowledge engineering requirements that come from
the aforesaid application domains. DLN is prototype oriented: it uses NC to
denote the normal/prototypical instances of a concept C, and extends termino-
logical axioms with prioritized defeasible inclusions (DIs) C ⊑n D.
A difficulty arising at a design level is that the notion itself of prototype can
be inherently ambiguous. Prototypes may represent in a frequentistic fashion the
properties that are shared by the majority of the instances, or they can differently
be interpreted idealistically as platonic models that might not exist in the real
world due to their degree of perfection. DLN does not aim at encompassing
all different, and philosophically interesting, notions of prototype; being plainly
application-oriented, it is rather inspired by what McCarthy calls communication
and database storage conventions [37]. In this perspective, a prototype NC is
meant to factorize the common features of the concept C and confine exceptional
subclasses to an explicit detailed axiomatization (so as to reduce the size and cost
of knowledge bases and improve their readability). Thus, defeasible inclusions
C ⊑n D mean (roughly speaking): “by default, all prototypical instances that
satisfy C satisfy also D, unless stated otherwise”, that is, unless some higher
priority axioms contradict this implication. If such a contradiction arises, then
C ⊑n D is overridden. The standard/prototypical instances of C are required to
satisfy all the DIs that are not overridden in C.
As mentioned above, also other nonmonotonic logics support defeasible in-
heritance with overriding in general. Nevertheless, in each of these previous ap-
proaches, either some desiderable features are missing or some natural inferences
do not hold. Moreover, they are generally based on complex semantics which
make defeasible reasoning difficult to track.3 In this respect, DLN’s behavior is
easier to grasp, and is expected to facilitate knowledge engineers in formulating
and validate ontologies at a large scale, while producing the expected conclu-
sions.
Finally, apart from rational closure and restricted forms of typicality [30], de-
feasible reasoning significantly increases the computational complexity of stan-
dard reasoning tasks even in low-complexity description logics [27,8,12]. Con-
versely, in all DL fragments of pratical interest, DLN does not manifest a higher
complexity with respect to the classical counterpart. Moreover, efficiency can be
further enhanced through a range of optimization techniques, including modu-
larization [13].
3 For example, circumscription identifies, in case of conflicting nonmonotonic axioms,
all optimal repairs and then computes the inferences that hold for all repairs.
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Name Syntax Semantics
top ⊤ ∆I
bottom ⊥ ∅
negation ¬C ∆I \ CI
conjunction C ⊓D CI ∩DI
disjunction C ⊔D CI ∪DI
∃ restriction ∃R.C {d ∈ ∆I | ∃e ∈ ∆I .[(d, e) ∈ RI ∧ e ∈ CI ]}
∀ restriction ∀R.C {d ∈ ∆I | ∀e ∈ ∆I .[(d, e) ∈ RI → e ∈ CI ]}
Fig. 1. Syntax and semantics of some common constructs.
This paper is meant to illustrate DLN and its main features, extending pre-
vious discussions of DLN’s properties with some recent contributions to rational
closure. The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we briefly recall
the basics of monotonic description logics. In Section 3 we introduce DLN and
provide a few examples of knowledge bases and inference. Section 4 compares
DLN with the other major nonmonotonic DLs in terms of practical engineering
requirements, and in terms of logical properties, centred around the KLM pos-
tulates. The paper is concluded by a summary and a list of interesting topics for
further work.
2 Preliminaries
Description logics are a family of formal languages representing the logical foun-
dations of the W3C Ontology Web Language (OWL2). They offer a variegated
set of logical constructors and axioms that balance between expressiveness and
computational complexity according to the application needs. Due to space limi-
tations, we refer to [5] for a comprehensive overview. Here, we just introduce the
DL fragment ALC, which allows to understand the examples that will follow.
An alphabet or signature consists of a set NC of concept names, a set NR of
role names, and (possibly) a set NI of individual names (all countably infinite).
Thereafter, metavariables A, B will range over concept names, R and S over
roles, and a, b and d over individual names. The term predicate will refer to a
generic element of NC ∪ NR.
In DLs, a wide range of operators allow to inductively formulate compound
concepts. The logic ALC, in particular, compound concepts are defined by the
following grammar:
C,D ::= A | ⊤ | ⊥ | ¬C | C ⊓D | C ⊔D | ∃R.C | ∀R.C .
Note, however, that our framework applies also to more expressive DLs such as
SROIQ(D) that constitutes the foundation of the full standard OWL2.
The semantics of DLs is defined in terms of interpretations I = 〈∆I , ·I〉. The
domain ∆I is a non-empty set of individuals and the interpretation function ·I
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maps each concept name A ∈ NC to a subset AI of ∆I , each role name R ∈ NR
to a binary relation RI on ∆I , and each individual name a ∈ NI to an individual
aI ∈ ∆I . The extension of ·I to ALC compound concepts is inductively defined
as shown in the third column of Figure 1. An interpretation I is called a model
of a concept C if CI 6= ∅.
A (general) TBox is a finite set of concept inclusions (CIs) C ⊑ D. As usual,
we use C ≡ D as an abbreviation for C ⊑ D and D ⊑ C. An ABox is a finite
set of concept assertions C(a) and role assertions R(a, b). An interpretation I
satisfies (i) a CI C ⊑ D if CI ⊆ DI , (ii) an assertion C(a) if aI ∈ CI , and (iii)
an assertion R(a, b) if (aI , bI) ∈ RI . Then, I is a (classical) model of a TBox T
(resp. an ABox A) if I satisfies all the members of T (resp. A).
In this paper, we will sometimes mention some important DLs that have
been extensively studied in the literature and constitute the foundation of se-
mantic web standards. The logic EL supports only ⊤, ⊓, and ∃. Its extension
EL⊥ supports also ⊥. The logic EL++ further adds concrete domains and some
expressive role inclusions (see [2] for further details).
The logic DL-liteR [17] supports inclusions shaped like C ⊑ D and C ⊑ ¬D,
where C and D range over concept names and unqualified existential restric-
tions such as ∃R and ∃R− (where R− is the inverse of role R). EL++ and
DL-liteR, respectively, constitute the foundation of the OWL2 profiles OWL2-
EL and OWL2-QL. Both play an important role in applications; their inference
problems are tractable (the same holds for some extensions of DL-liteR, see [1]).
Finally, we will use in Section 4.2 boolean combinations of assertions and
inclusions. Although these axioms are not directly allowed in DLs, they can be
simulated in SROIQ(D) through the universal role U . For example, ¬(C ⊑ D)
and (C1 ⊑ D1) ∨ (C2 ⊑ D2) can be expressed as ⊤ ⊑ ∃U.(C ⊓ ¬D) and ⊤ ⊑
(∀U.(¬C1 ⊔D1)) ⊔ (∀U.(¬C2 ⊔D2)), respectively.
3 The defeasible logic DLN
Given a classical description logic language DL, let DLN be the extension of DL
with a new concept name NC for each DL concept C. NC is called a normality
concept and denotes the normal instances of C.
A DLN knowledge base is a disjoint union KB = S ∪ D such that
– S is a finite set of DL concept inclusions and assertions;
– D is a finite set of defeasible inclusions (DIs, for short) C ⊑n D where C
and D are DLN concepts.
Thereafter, given a DI δ = C ⊑n D, by pre(δ) and con(δ) we denote C and D,
respectively. A knowledge base is canonical if pre(δ) does not contain normality
concepts, for all δ ∈ D.
Roughly, C ⊑n D means: “the normal instances of C are instances of D,
unless stated otherwise by some higher priority axioms”. As mentioned in the
introduction DIs have an utilitarian purpose. They are meant to factorize the
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common properties that hold for normal entities, so as to minimize the amount
of knowledge that must be explicitly encoded.
Defeasible inclusions are prioritized by a strict partial order ≺ over D. The
intended meaning of δ1 ≺ δ2 is that δ1 has higher priority than δ2 and, in case
of conflicts, it is preferable to sacrifice δ2. DL
N solves automatically only the
conflicts that can be settled using ≺. Any other conflict shall be resolved by
the knowledge engineer (typically by adding specific DIs). Here, we focus on
a priority relation which is determined by so-called specificity. Roughly speak-
ing, specificity states that, in case of conflicts, the specific properties of pre(δ1)
override those of the more general concept pre(δ2):
δ1 ≺ δ2 iff S |= pre(δ1) ⊑ pre(δ2) and S 6|= pre(δ2) ⊑ pre(δ1) . (1)
Note that DLN is largely parametric with respect to which priority relation is
used. An alternative choice could be, for example, a priority relation based on
the ranking function of rational closure adopted in [20].
Due to space limitations, we refer to [7] for the model-theoretic semantics of
DLN. Here, we present only its reduction to classical reasoning.
Let KB = S∪D be a DLN knowledge base and α a query of interest, that can
be either a CI or an assertion. By KB |≈ α we mean that α is a DLN semantic
consequence of KB.
The classical reduction of |≈ requires some preliminary notions:
– For all DIs δ ∈ D and all normality concepts NC ∈ Σ, let
δNC =
(
NC ⊓ pre(δ) ⊑ con(δ)
)
;
– for all sets of DL axioms S ′ and all DIs δ, let S ′ ↓≺δ denote the result of
removing from S ′ all the axioms δNC0 such that δ0’s priority is not higher
than δ’s:
S ′ ↓≺δ= S
′ \ {δNC0 | NC ∈ Σ ∧ δ0 6≺ δ} ;
– finally, let δ1, . . . , δ|D| be an arbitrary linearization of (D,≺), which means
that {δ1, . . . , δ|D|} = D and for all i, j = 1, . . . , |D|, if δi ≺ δj then i < j.
Then, KB |≈ α holds iff KBΣ |= α, where Σ is the set of normality concepts
occurring in both KB and α, and KBΣ is the classical knowledge base resulting
from the following inductive construction (where i = 1, 2, . . . , |D|):
SΣ0 = S ∪
{
NC ⊑ C | NC ∈ Σ
}
(2)
SΣi = S
Σ
i−1 ∪
{
δNCi | NC ∈ Σ and S
Σ
i−1 ↓≺δi ∪{δ
NC
i } 6|= NC ⊑ ⊥
}
(3)
KBΣ = SΣ|D| . (4)
In informal terms, the first step extends S with the axioms NC ⊑ C stating
that the normal instances of C are a fortiori instances of C. The construction
proceeds by processing the DIs δi ∈ D in decreasing priority order; if adding δi
to the (higher priority) δj ≺ δi that have been previously selected does not make
NC inconsistent, as stated by (3), then δNCi is included in KB
Σ , otherwise δNCi
is discarded (overridden).
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Example 1. Recall that situs inversus refers to humans whose heart is on the
right-hand side of the thorax, differently from typical humans whose heart is on
the opposite side. If we stipulate that no heart can be simultaneously located on
both sides, then a simple axiomatization is:
Human ⊑n ∃has heart.LH (5)
SI ⊑ Human (6)
SI ⊑ ∃has heart.RH (7)
∃has heart.LH ⊑ ¬∃has heart.RH (8)
where LH (resp. RH) denotes left-positioned (resp. right-positioned) hearts and
SI stands for situs inversus.
Since S ⊆ KBΣ , by (7) and (8) we have that the instances of SI have their
heart on the right-hand side (and hence not on the left-hand side):
KB |≈ SI ⊑ ∃has heart.RH (9) KB |≈ SI ⊑ ¬∃has heart.LH . (10)
Then, let Σ = {NHuman}. It is straightforward to see that KBΣ consists of
the strong axioms (6) – (8), plus
NHuman ⊑ Human (11) Human ⊓ NHuman ⊑ ∃has heart.LH .(12)
Consequently, we have that
KB |≈ NHuman ⊑ ∃has heart.LH . (13)
Moreover, as a classical consequence of the above inferences, one can further
conclude that people with situs inversus are not standard humans:
KB |≈ SI ⊑ ¬NHuman . (14)
Conversely, if Σ = {NSI}, the iterative construction of KBΣ adds in first step
the axiom
NSI ⊑ SI , (15)
then the DI (5) is overridden, since adding
Human ⊓ NSI ⊑ ∃has heart.LH (16)
would make, together with axioms (6), (7), (8), and (15), NSI inconsistent.
Consequently, NSI is simply a consistent subclass of SI that does not satisfy
any further property.
Now, extend KB with the additional DI:
Human ⊑n ∃has organ.Nose . (17)
Note that (17) and (5) have both maximal priority (indeed, they are incompa-
rable by specificity). It is easy to see that (17) is overridden neither in NHuman
nor in NSI, therefore both of the following inferences are valid:
KB |≈ NHuman ⊑ ∃has organ.Nose (18)
KB |≈ NSI ⊑ ∃has organ.Nose . (19)
In other words, the property of having a nose is inherited even if (14) make SI
exceptional w.r.t. Human. ⊓⊔
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Example 2. Consider the following variant of Nixon’s diamond [7]:
Quaker ⊑n Pacifist , (20)
Republican ⊑n ¬Pacifist , (21)
RepQuaker ⊑ Republican ⊓ Quaker . (22)
Note that the two DIs (20) and (21) are incomparable under specificity. More-
over, since they both can be individually satisfied by NRepQuaker, without mak-
ing it inconsistent, none of them is overridden in NRepQuaker. It follows that
NRepQuakermust satisfy both DIs and consequently RepQuaker is associated to
an inconsistent prototype:
KB |≈ NRepQuaker ⊑ ⊥ . (23)
Note that even if the prototype of RepQuaker is inconsistent, the knowledge
base is consistent, as well as many normality concepts. In particular, we have
KB 6|≈ NQuaker ⊑ ⊥ and KB 6|≈ NRepublican ⊑ ⊥.
Moreover, consequence (23) cannot be resolved by logic since (20) and (21)
are perfectly symmetric w.r.t. NRepQuaker. Removing the inconsistency is up
to the knowledge engineer which has to choose how to repair KB. For instance,
adding RepQuaker ⊑n Pacifist (resp. RepQuaker ⊑n ¬Pacifist) resolves the
conflict in favor of the first (resp. second) DI. ⊓⊔
Remark 1. The other nonmonotonic semantics of DLs silently “hide” unresolved
conflicts, by deriving none of the conflicting properties. The result is a gap in
the knowledge base. For example, Nixon was notoriously not a pacifist, and until
the conflict is resolved, this information is not accessible to reasoners. In other
examples, such knowledge gaps may have important consequences [7]. Unlike
the other nonmonotonic logics, DLN helps knowledge engineers in identifying
the gaps caused by unresolved conflicts. Searching for inconsistent prototypes
is analogous to the classical KB debugging activity consisting in identifying
inconsistent concepts, and all engines support it.
Example 3. In several countries (e.g. Mexico, Norway and Brazil) military ser-
vice is mandatory for male citizens (except for special cases such as mental
disorders). After military training, citizens become reservists, and shall join the
army again in case of war. This can be formalized with the following DIs:
MaleCitizen ⊑n HasMilitaryTraining (24)
MaleCitizen⊓ HasMilitaryTraining⊑n Reservist . (25)
The exceptions to the above rules include minors:
MinorMaleCitizen⊑ MaleCitizen (26)
MinorMaleCitizen⊑ ¬HasMilitaryTraining . (27)
Axiom (27) should prevent (25) from being applied to minors, that is, it should
not be possible to conclude that N MinorMaleCitizen ⊑ Reservist (indeed,
this is what happens with DLN). ⊓⊔
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For what concerns the computational complexity of DLN, notice that the
iterative construction of KBΣ requires, at each step i ∈ {1, . . . , |D|}, (i) to
restrict SΣi to the DIs that have a higher priority than δi, and (ii) to evaluate
|Σ| consistency checks. If the priority relation is based on specificity, checking
whether δj ≺ δi consists in solving two subsumption problems and hence it has
the same complexity as entailment in DL. Also the second point simply comes
down to classical reasoning in the underlying DL. Consequently, DLN entailment
has the same complexity as in DL. In general, considering that different priority
relations can be used, the following characterization holds.
Theorem 1. Let DL be a DL fragment such that subsumption (resp. instance)
checking in DL belongs to a complexity class C, and deciding the preference
relation ≺ belongs to PC.4 If DL supports ⊓ in the left-hand side of inclusions,
then subsumption (resp. instance) checking in DLN is in PC.
Since PP equals P, the entailment problem KB |≈ α is tractable in low com-
plexity description logics such as (DL-lite
(HN )
horn )
N [1] and (EL++ )N. Similarly,
Theorem 1 tells us that SROIQN reasoning is in PN2ExpTime for suitable priority
relations.
4 Features and comparisons
4.1 Knowledge engineering requirements
The DLN family of logics results from a utilitarian way of approaching nonmono-
tonic logic design. The main goal of this approach is addressing the practical
needs of ontology and policy designers, that have been illustrated with several
examples in the literature on biomedical ontologies and semantic web policies.
Here is a summary of the main shortcomings addressed by DLN (see [7] for more
details and explanations):
– Inheritance blocking. Most of the logics grounded on preferential semantics
and rational closure block the inheritance of all default properties towards
exceptional subclasses (as opposed to overriding only the properties that are
modified in those subclasses). DLN’s overriding mechanism does not suffer
from this drawback (see Example 1).
– Undesired CWA effects. Many nonmonotonic DLs extend default properties
to as many individuals as possible, thereby introducing CWA (i.e. closed-
world assumption) effects that clash with the intended behavior of ontologies.
For instance, exceptional concepts (such as SI in Example 1) collapse to the
list of constants that are explicitly asserted to be in the concept (and if no
such constants exist, exceptional concepts become inconsistent). DLN does
not introduce any CWA effect because it does not force individuals to be
normal, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
4 PC is the class of all problems that can be solved by a deterministic Turing machine
in polynomial time using an oracle for C.
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– Control on priorities. Since priorities are not fixed a priori inDLN, knowledge
engineers can adapt them to their needs. In principle, it is possible to override
DIs based on temporal criteria (which may be useful in legal ontologies and
ontology versioning), define default conflict resolution criteria, and even use
rational closure’s specificity-based axiom ranking. The logics derived from
inheritance networks, preferential semantics, and rational closure can only
support their fixed, specificity-based overriding criterion.
– Default role fillers. Should role values be restricted to normal individuals?
Sometimes, this kind of inference is desirable, sometimes it is not, cf. [7].
Some logics are completely unable to apply default properties to role values.5
Some others cannot switch this inference off when it is not desired. Only DLN
and ALC+Tmin make it possible to control this kind of inference. Due to its
explicit priorities, DLN is also able to encode a design pattern that makes
role ranges normal whenever this does not override any explicit DI.
– Inconsistent prototype detection. We argued that when conflicts cannot be
settled by priorities, silent conflict resolution is not a desirable feature: knowl-
edge engineers should be involved because there is no universally correct
automated resolution criterion (cf. Example 2). Only DLN and probabilis-
tic description logics (and ALC + Tmin, in some very specific cases) detect
inconsistent prototypes and make them evident, as advocated in Remark 1.
– Unique deductive closure. As a result of automated conflict resolution, several
nonmonotonic logics yield multiple deductive closures, corresponding to all
the alternative ways of solving each conflict. DLN is one of the logics that
has a unique closure.
– Generality. Nonmonotonic extensions should be applicable to all description
logics, or at least to the standard OWL2-DL (i.e. the logic SROIQ(D)).
Typicality logics and rational closure, instead, are limited to logics that
satisfy the disjoint union model property. Recently, it has been shown that
for expressive DLs that do not enjoy this property, syntactic inference does
not match semantics [6]. The same paper introduces stable rational closure
that solves the generality problem for rational closure, but re-introduces the
issue of multiple (or non existent) deductive closures. It is currently not clear
how to design a logic that satisfies the KLM postulates, is fully general, and
yields a unique closure for all knowledge bases.
– Low complexity. DLN preserves the tractability of these reasoning tasks for
all low-complexity DLs, including the rich tractable logics EL++ and DL-
lite
(HN )
Horn
. Currently, no other nonmonotonic DL enjoys this property to the
same extent. Rational closure has been proved to be tractable for EL ex-
tended with ⊥ [23,38]. Some logics, such as [20,19,22,31,28], preserve the
asymptotic complexity of ExpTime-complete DLs like ALC. More generally,
DLN preserves the asymptotic complexity of all the DLs that belong to a
5 This is the case for rational closure. Recently, in [38], a solution has been proposed
for EL with ⊥. It is unclear how to extend it to more expressive DLs, and it is not
possible to “turn off” the application of default rules to role fillers.
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deterministic complexity class that contains P. For nondeterministic com-
plexity classes C, an upper bound is P C .
DLN has been designed to address the above practical issues. In general, the
utilitarian approach led us to make DLN neutral with respect to the inferences
that are not always desired: when possible, DLN gives knowledge engineers the
ability of switching those inferences on and off. The final result of this investiga-
tion is a logic that enjoys a unique set of properties, as shown by the summary
in Table 1.
Table 1. Summary of comparisons with nonmonotonic DLs
CIRC DEF AEL TYP RAT PR
Features [12,11] [3,4] [25] [31,28] [20,19] [22] [36] DLN
no inheritance
blocking
X X X X X X
no CWA effects X X X X X
fine-grained
control
on role ranges
X
(1)
X
detects in-
consistent
prototypes
X
(1)
X
(2)
X
unique deductive
closure
X X X
preserves tractabil-
ity
X
generality X X X X X
implicit specificity X X X X
other priorities X X X
(1) Partially supported.
(2) Inconsistency may propagate to the entire KB.
We deliberately refrained from adding a priori any requirements that are not
directly motivated by applications, such as the KLM postulates. Interestingly,
DLN satisfies many of those postulates, though, as illustrated in the next section.
4.2 DLN and the KLM axioms
In this section we analyze the logical properties of DLN through the KLM postu-
lates. In [33,35,34], Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor argued that in order to reason
about what normally holds in the world, it is desirable to make nonmonotonic
consequence relations closed under certain properties, called KLM postulates.
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Table 2. The KLM postulates in DLN
Name Rule schema Sound in DLN
REF
α ∈ KB
KB |≈ α
X
CT
KB |≈ α KB ∪ {α} |≈ γ
KB |≈ γ
X
CM
KB |≈ α KB |≈ γ
KB ∪ {α} |≈ γ
X
LLE
KB ∪ {α} |≈ γ |= α ≡ β
KB ∪ {β} |≈ γ
X
RW
KB |≈ α α |= γ
KB |≈ γ
X
OR
KB ∪ {α} |≈ γ KB ∪ {β} |≈ γ
KB ∪ {α ∨ β} |≈ γ
under extra axioms
RM
KB |≈ γ KB 6|≈ ¬α
KB ∪ {α} |≈ γ
under extra axioms
KB is a canonical DLN knowledge base;
α and β range over DL assertions and (strong) concept and role inclusions;
γ ranges over DLN assertions and DLN concept/role inclusions;
nonstandard DL axioms α ∨ β, ¬β can be simulated, e.g. with the universal role;
|≈ denotes the nonmonotonic consequence relation of DLN and |= classical inference.
Although these postulates are not necessarily desiderata, due to the loose corre-
spondence between their motivations and DLN’s goals and semantics (cf. [7,15]),
we regard them as a useful technical tool for comparison, since the validity of
the postulates has been extensively investigated in most nonmonotonic logics.
There exist several versions of the postulates; all of them contain postulates
that are incompatible with DLN’s novel way of highlighting unresolved con-
flicts through inconsistent prototypes, for debugging purposes. So, hereafter, we
assume that all unresolved conflicts have been fixed, as recommended by this
knowledge engineering methodology.
The first version of the postulates – illustrated in Table 2 – is the verbatim
instantiation of the original, meta-level postulates. A consequence relation that
satisfies the KLM postulates is called rational. It is called preferential if it sat-
isfies all rules but RM, and cumulative if it satisfies all rules but RM and OR.
With respect to this version of the postulates, DLN’s consequence relation (|≈)
is cumulative.6
6 Obviously, REF and RW always hold, because DLN is closed under classical infer-
ence. Moreover rules CT, CM, and LLE are sound by [15, Thm 1].
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It is interesting to note that the rational closure of DLs itself is not rational
w.r.t. this version of the postulates, e.g. it fails to satisfy the OR rule [15]. On
the contrary, DLN can be made fully rational by making it a little more similar
to typicality logic and rational closure, in the following respect. The semantic of
typicality and rational closure forces each consistent concept to have a normal
instance, through the smoothness property of preferential models and the notion
of canonical model [29]. A similar condition can be enforced in DLN through the
axioms ¬(NC ⊑ ⊥), for all consistent C occurring in KB or in the query. The
knowledge bases so extended satisfy all the postulates in Table 2. The above
results provide an immediate comparison with the consequence relations of Cir-
cumscribed DLs (that are preferential) and those of Default and Autoepistemic
DLs (that are not cumulative).
Name Rule schema Sound
REFn
C ⊑n C
X
CTn
C ⊑n D C ⊓D ⊑n E
C ⊑n E
CMn
C ⊑n D C ⊑n E
C ⊓D ⊑n E
LLEn
C ⊑n E S |= C ≡ D
D ⊑n E
RWn
C ⊑n D S |= D ⊑ E
C ⊑n E
ORn
C ⊑n E D ⊑n E
C ⊔D ⊑n E
RMn
C ⊑n E C 6⊑n ¬D
C ⊓D ⊑n E
S is the strong part of a knowledge base
Table 3. Analogues of the KLM pos-
tulates for DIs [7]
Name Rule schema Sound
REFN
NC ⊑ C
X
CTN
NC ⊑ D N(C ⊓D) ⊑ E
NC ⊑ E
partly
CMN
NC ⊑ D NC ⊑ E
N(C ⊓D) ⊑ E
partly
LLEN
NC ⊑ E C ≡ D
ND ⊑ E
RWN
NC ⊑ D D ⊑ E
NC ⊑ E
X
ORN
NC ⊑ E ND ⊑ E
N(C ⊔D) ⊑ E
partly
RMN
NC ⊑ E NC 6⊑ ¬D
N(C ⊓D) ⊑ E
partly
C, D, and E range over DL concepts
Table 4. DLN Candidate inference
rules inspired by KLM postulates
Several logics internalize the nonmonotonic consequence relation and push
the KLM postulates to the object level (e.g. [20,21,22,18,16,28,29]). The result-
ing postulates for DLN are reported in Table 3. Their validity is clearly affected
by overriding. For instance, if the second premise of CMn were overridden, then
there would be no logical ground for supporting the conclusion. However, if the
premises are not overridden, then all the postulates of Table 3 are valid in DLN.
It is interesting to note that a similar phenomenon can be observed in Lehmanns
account of default reasoning [34]. In Sec. 6 Lehmann exhibits a knowledge base
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with no (consistent) rational closure; however it has a lexicographic closure be-
cause the latter ignores all overridden defaults. The second interesting remark
is that two of these postulates unconditionally hold in most practically interest-
ing cases: (i) the ORn rule holds if the priority relation is specificity; (ii) LLEn
holds whenever the priority relation is not sensitive to syntactic details i.e. treats
logically equivalent DIs in the same way (like specificity does).
Another internalized version of the postulates, analogous to those satisfied
by typicality logics [28,29] is reported in Table 4. It can be shown that typicality
DLs satisfy these postulates only because the normality criterion is assumed to
be concept-independent (i.e. if John is more typical than Mary as a driver, then
he must also be more typical than Mary as a worker, as a tax payer, and so
on) [15]. DLN does not adopt this strong assumption: in DLN each concept may
have its own notion of what is more normal or standard and – for this reason –
it does not universally satisfy CTN and CMN . So an interesting open question is
whether the postulates of Table 4 can possibly be satisfied by a logic that does
not rely on a unique, concept-independent normality relation.
Again, DLN can be made fully rational (with respect to this version of the
postulates) by making it more similar to rational closure. Consider the restriction
of DLN where N does not explicitly occur in KB (N can be used only in queries).
In practice, this means that role fillers cannot be forced to be normal, similarly
to what inevitably happens in rational closure and default DLs, due to the
limitations of these logics. Under this restriction, all postulates in Table 4 hold
[15, Thm 4, 5, 6].
5 Conclusions and future work
DLN addresses a number of drawbacks that affect the nonmonotonic seman-
tics of DLs. It has been designed with a particular attention to practical issues
that hinder the adoption of nonmonotonic semantics in OWL2 and its profiles,
including expressiveness limitations, and complexity problems. Moreover, DLN
reasoning can be easily reduced to classical reasoning, thereby leveraging the
high-quality, well-engineered implementations of DL reasoning. In the light of
these properties, DLN compares favorably to the other nonmonotonic DLs, as
summarized in Table 1.
Interestingly, even if KLM postulates played no role in DLN’s design, DLN
satisfies to a large extent the major meta-level and internalized versions of the
postulates. The postulates in Table 3 hold up to overriding, as in Lehmann’s
lexicographic closure. Moreover, DLN is flexible enough to satisfy all the other
postulates by means of additional axioms or syntactic restrictions that make
DLN more similar to typicality logics and rational closure.
Many different directions deserve further investigation. From a semantic
viewpoint, we mentioned in Section 4.2 that the KLM postulates OR and RM
are sound in DLN under the assumption that consistent concepts have at least
one typical individual. Taking inspiration from typicality logics, variants of DLN
can be investigated where this assumption is hard-coded in the semantics. This
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should be done with some care, though: if too many individuals were forced to
be normal, then the undesirable closed-world assumption effects described in [7],
that affect typicality logics, might be introduced in DLN.
The study of the logical properties of DLN can be refined by investigating
the mutual relationships between DIs and their effects on normality concepts. In
particular, it would be interesting to investigate hybrid versions of the postulates,
whose premises are taken from Table 3 while consequents are taken from Table 4.
Finally, one of the primary strengths of DLN is that it preserves the tractabil-
ity of the low-complexity DLs underlying the OWL2-EL and OWL2-QL profiles.
However, asymptotic tractability alone does not suffice for practical purposes. In
[13], two optimization techniques have been successfully applied to obtain real-
time query answering over large knowledge bases. One optimization is based
precisely on a suitably modified module extraction algorithm, that so far con-
stitutes the most effective optimization technique for DLN (excluding combined
approaches). The other optimization, called optimistic method, reduces the num-
ber of retractions (an expensive class of operations in incremental reasoning).
DLN’s module extractor, however, proved to be less effective for KBs that con-
tain many explicit occurrences of the normality concepts, and for those with
nonempty ABoxes (due to the lesser effectiveness of the underlying classical
module extractors in such contexts). To overcome these problematic cases, we
plan to improve the module extractor for DLN by discarding the normality con-
cepts (and related axioms) and assertions that are irrelevant to a given query.
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